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CASE COMMENTS
AUTOMOBILES-ItASTER

LIABLE FOE

INJURIES' BY CHAUFFEUR

WHERE

DEPARTURE FROM MASTER'S BUSINESS wAs TEmPoRARY-Appellee was
struck, knocked down, and injured by the truck of appellant company
while walking along one of the streets of the city of Louisville. He
Instituted this action against the company to recovery damages. The
jury returned a verdict in his favor for $1,610.00. The defendant appealed. The appellant admits the accident and injuries, but by way of
defence, says that the driver of the truck had abandoned his employment and was pursuing, for the moment, business of his own, that the
driver had temporarily abandoned the employment of the master.
In the evidence it appeared that the truck driver had deviated several
blocks from the direct route which his master expected him to take
In returning to the company's place of business, in ,rder to obtain
money which had been left at the house of the truck driver's father.
Held the master was liable. Fleisehmann Co. v. Howe, 213 Ky. 110,
280 S. W. 496.
The general rule as expressed in many opinions of courts through3ut the country makes the master liable for. injuries inflicted by the
servant where the departure from the master's business was only temporary. Lee v. Pierce, 112 Okla. 212; 239 Pac. 989; -ones v. Wiegand,
119 N. Y. Sup. 441; Geraty v. Arational Ice Co., 44 N. Y. Sup. 569.
There may be a deviation from the servant's duty in his employment, and that, too, for some purpose, or for some motive of his own.
and he may still be acting within the scope of his employment and
in the range of his mater's business. Quinn v. Power (87 N. Y. 535, 41
Am. R. 392) is generally resognized as authority on this proposition.
The law in Kentucky on this point is well settled by a long line
of decisions. Eakin's Admist-'itor v. Anderson, 169 Ky. 1; Tyler v.
Stephen's Administrator,163 Ky. 770, 174 S. W. 790; Grady v. Greer, 183
Ky. 675, 210 S. W. 167; Vull-m & Haynes Co. v. Crisp, 207 Ky. 31, 268
S. W. 576; Wyatt v. Hodson. 210 Ky. 47, 275 S. W. 15.
From these decisions one can readily see that a servant deviating
from his prescribed course, where the deviation is only slight, will
undoubtedly bind his master for his negligent acts.
S. G. C.
CONSTIUAL

LAW-CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO ENGAGE IN

INESS OR OCCUPATION SUBJECT TO REGULATIONS

BUS-

AND RESTRAINTS ESSEN-

TIAL TO THE PRESERVATION OF PUBLIC WEAL-The Real Estate Commis-

sion of the State of Kentucky revoked the license of X for 1924
and refused his application for the year of 1925. The reason for this
action was alleged to be that he was guilty of certain immoral conduct
in the transaction of his real estate business.
The court decided that it is not in the power of the legislature to
prescribe the moral qualifications of real estate brokers and salesmen,
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and to confer upon the commission the power to withhold or revoke
their license, if in their estimation they do not possess such qualifications. Rawles v. Jenkins, 212 Ky. 287, 279 S. W. 350.
Among the inherent and inalienable rights guaranteed to our citizens by our Bill of Rights, are the rights of enjoying and defending
their lives and liberties, and acquiring and protecting property. Kentucky Constitution, Section 1, Sub-sect. 1 and 5. Not only does this
Include the rights to acquire and protect property but the right to engage in any business or occupation that is not injurious to the public
weal. Lawton v. Stewart Dry Goods Co., 197 Ky. 394. This right is
subject to reasonable regulations essential to public safety and health.
Moral fitness is desirable on the part of real estate brokers and is
also desirable in every business man, but unless the business is unusually dangerous to the public weal, we should leave something to
religious and moral training, to public opinion and to the ordinary
laws of the land. As a real estate broker's occupation is no more dangerous to the public weal, than any other ordinary occupation of life,
the court in the principal case said that it was constrained to hold the
Statute unconstitutional as far as it allows the commission to judge
the moral fitness of the applicant, and to make the retention or obtaining of a license depend upon their opinion as to the moral fitness of
the applicant or licensee.
The right of a citizen to pursue an ordinary calling Is a part of
their right of liberty and property, and any law which prevents or
abridges this privilege is obnoxious to the Constitution of this State
and the United States, Bessette v. People, 193 Ill. 334, 62 N. E. 215, 56
L. R. A. 558; Bracev!Zle Coal Co. v. People, 147 Ill. 66, 37 A. S. R. 206.
O5 N. E. 62; Wice v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 193 Ill. 356, 61 N. E. 1984.
The rule as declared by the U. S. Court, is that liberty as used in
the 14th Amendment is not only the right of a citizen to be free from
the restraint of his person as by incarceration, but the term is deemed
to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the employment of all
his faculties, to be free to use them in all lawful ways, to live and
work where he will to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling, to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all
contracts which may be necessary and essential to his carrying out
to a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned; Allgeyer v.
Louisiana, 165 U. S. 589.
The "property" protected by this Amendment includes not only
the thing owned but the right to acquire, use, and dispose of It. Buchanan v. Whartley, 245 U. S. 60. The regulation of trade, business, or
profession is within the domain of the police power; such regulation
may more or less restrict liberty or impair the value of the property,
as long as the regulation is reasonable. Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 708;
Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U. S. 188; Nutting v. Mass., 183 U. S. 553.
The right to follow any legitimate calling is protected by Constitutional Amendment 14 E. 1. Commonwealth v. Beaulieu, 213 Mass
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138, 99 N. E. 955. The refusal, for example, to permit one to engage in
the business of an undertaker without good reason, -violates his constitutional rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Wyette v.
Thomas et al., 200 Mass. 474, 86 N. E. 925.
The act of a legislature requiring that brokers in towns of the
size of 300,000 inhabitants shall have written authority for the sale
of real property, or if this provision is broken, they are guilty of a
misdemeanor, is unconstitutional as interfering with their constitutional right to engage in an occupation. Woolley v. Hears, 125 S. W.
1112, 226 Mo. 41, 136 A. S. R. 637; Cornett v. Cabrillac, 126 S. W. 1030,
228 Mo. 212; Printz v. Miller, 135 S. W. 19, 233 Mo. 47.
W. E. F.
CONSTITUTIONAL

L.w-LEGisLATRn

HAS POWER TO PROHIBIT THE

ASSIGNM-NT OF CLAIMS FOR WORKs-EN's Co MENsATION.-The appellant

was engaged in the business of builder in the city of Louisville; the
appellee was in the employ, of the appellant. Both had accepted the
provision of the "Workmen's Compensation Act" (Kentucky Statutes,
sections 4880-4987). Appellee sustained an injury covered by the act,
and the compensation board rendered an award in his favor for certain allowable items, and in addition found that he had sustained
ten per cent permanent partial disability. The employer disputed the
correctness of the award for any per cent of permanent disability, and
he appealed to the Jefferson Circuit Court as provided by the act. While
the action was pending, the parties compromised the claim, put the
agreement into writing, and filed it in court, with a motion that judgment be rendered accordingly. The appellant's demurrer was overruled, and judgment rendered on the agreement. Held, the act was
passed under the "police power" for the welfare of workmen, who work
under the dangers of modern industry. Section 32 of section 4913,
stating that no claim for compensation under this act shall be assignable, and claims of creditors shall not work to destroy such compensation, is a necessary part of the safety to public welfare. Further, if
the legislature had the power to prohibit assignments they had the
right to prohibit compromises between the parties. Section 8 of section
4889 of the act, stating that no contract or agreement, written or im-plied, no rule or regulation, or other device, shall in any way operate
to relieve any employer in whole or in part of any obligation created
by this act, except as herein provided, is constitutional. The verdict
was reversed and the appeal ordered to be taken up and considered as
If there had been no agreement. Worlcmen's Compensation Board of
Kentuckcy v. Abbott, 212 Ky. 123, 278 S. W. 533.
The holding of the principal case is in harmony with the court's
earlier decisions. It was held in Equitable Life Insurance Society v.
Commonwealth, 113 Ky. 126, 67 S. W. 388, that section 656 of the Kentucky Statutes, providing that no life insurance company doing business In Kentucky should make or permit any distinction or discrimination in rates, etc., or allow any rebates of premiums, was constitu-
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tional; that it was passed to protect the welfare of the public. Then
again in King v. Commonwealth, 197 Ky. 128, 246 S. W. 162, the "Blue
Sky Laws," section 882e-2, Kentucky Statutes, requiring those who sell
contracts of investments, or securities in this state, to procure the
approval of the State Banking Commission and to procure a license
before selling or offering for sale in this state, was upheld as within
the "police power" of the legislature. In the opinion Judge Clark
said, "There is nowhere among free people any doubt of or disposition
to contest the right of the individual to freely contract with reference
to his property, or that this right is fully protected by the State or
Federal" constitutions, but as one individual's absolute right of freedom in all matters ends where another's begins, It Is universally recognized that in order to secure the right to all and for the common good
the sovereign State within its indefinable 'police power; may and often
must prescribe reasonable regulations for the exercise thereof."
For similar decisions in other jurisdictions see. Hall v. Geigef
Jones Co., 242 U. S. 539; Ullman Realty Co. v. Tamur, 185. N. Y. S. 612;
McMillan v. City of Knoxvile, 139 Tenn. 319, 202 S. W. 65; State v
Cantrwell, 179 Mo. 245, 78 S. W. 569; Binford v. Boyd, 174 Pa. 56;
Chapman v. Railway Fuel Co., 101 So. 879, 212 Ala. 106; Davis V. Keystone Steel & Wire Co., 317 Ill. 278, 148 N. E. 47. For decisions where
the courts have deemed that the legislature went beyond reasonable
restrictions see: Record Publishing Co. v. Monson, 213 Pac. 13, modified
in 215 Pac. 71; Real Silk Hosiery Mills v. City of Richmond, California,
298 Fed. 126.
3. S. F.
CORPORATIONS-JUD MENT AGAINST ONE CORPORATION MAY NOT nE
ENFORcED AGAINST ANOTHER To WHICH THE FIRST HAS SOLD ITS PROPERTY.-The X corporation owned several leases in Pike County which
it conveyed to the appellant together with all of its tangible personal
property, "save and except its cash on hand or in the bank and its
bills and notes receivable." The appellant immediately took possession of the property and operated the leases. Thereafter appellee's
intestate while working in the mine was injured and died as a result.
His administrator, the appellee, brought an action against the X corporation which resulted in a verdict in favor of the appellee. An execution upon the judgment was issued and returned "no property found."
The appellee thereafter filed his bill in equity against the X corporation
and the appellant seeking to enforce against the appellant the judgment which it had previously recovered against the X corporation.
Held: he could not reach the funds in appellant's hands. Norfolk &
Western Ry. Co. v. Jack Murphy Adm'r of W. Murphy, 213 Ky. 464,
281 S. W. 471.
The court on appeal said, "It has been held in a number of cases
that where one corporation owns another or another is merged in it,
so that the second is only a name for the first, a judgment against the
second may be enforced against the first. L. & N. R. B. Co. v. Biddell,
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112 Ky. 494; Harbison
Co. v. McFarland, 156 Ky. 44; Kentucky &
C. Colliery v. Mellon, 200 Ky. 198; Hart Steel Co. v. B. Supply Co., 244
U. S. 294."
After reviewing these cases the court said: "But those cases have
no application here for the appellant at no time owned the X corporation. It simply purchased its tangible personal property and is in
no wise answerable for Its debts "by reason of the fact that "s purchased its property. Kentucky, &c. v. Webb, 181 Ky. 90; American Express Co. v. Commonwealth, 190 Ky. 363.
A corporation which purchases property known by the pi'omoters
and stockholders to be all of the property of another corporation, issuing therefor its stock to the stockholders of the other coporation, holds
It subject to the debts of the other corporation, including a judgment
for negligence recovered after the sale. Grenell v. Detroit Gas Co., 112
Mich. 70, 70 N. W. 413.
Where all the assets and the francise of a corporation are transferred to another corporation, a liability of the old company founded
on tort must be established by judgment against it, before such liability can be enforced against the transferee. Chase v. Michigan Tel. Co.,
121 Mich. 631, 80 N. W. 717.
The principle that when one corporation goes out of existence by
merger with or annexation to another corporation in the absence of
any arrangements as to the former's liabilities, the latter becomes
liable therefor is not applicable when a new- corporation has acquired
the property of another, not by contract with it, but by a purchase
from those to whom the property was transferred under a valid sale
or foreclosure of a lien, although such sale did cause the former corporation to go out of existence. National Foundry and Pipe Works v.
Oconto City Water Supply Co., 105 Wis. 48, 81 N. W. 125, Affirmed 22
-S. Ct. 111, 183 U. S. 216.
A corporation has the same right to sell its property as a natural
person has and the purchaser of the property of a corporation occupies
toward the creditors the same attitude as the purchaser from an individual would occupy toward the creditors of an individual. If however the purchasing corporation merely becomes the owner of all the
stock of the selling corporation and pays the purchase price to the
stockholders, the purchasing corporation will become liable for the
Indebtedness of the selling corporation. Kentucky Distilleries & Warchouse Company v. Webb's Executor, 181 Ky. 90, 203 S. W. 870.
The opinion of the court in the principal case follows a well established doctrine that a consolidated corporation is answerable for the
debts, obligations and liabilities of the constituent corporations, Carter
Coal Co. v. Clouse, 163 Ky. 337, 173 S. W. 974; Harbison-Walker Re.
lactories Co. v. McFarland, 156 Ky. 44, 160 S. W. 789, whether arising
ex contractu, Union Pacific Ry. v. Maria T7. McAlpine, 129 U. S. 305;
or ex delicto Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co. v. Biddell, 112 Ky. 494,
66 S. W. .34, 23 Ky. L. R. 1702, and draws a distinction between such a
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transaction and a sale by which a corporation disposes of its entire
assets and practically goes out of business leaving unpaid obligations.
The.latter will be carefully scrutinized and a strict rule of accountability will be applied against the purchasing corporation, but where
nothing appears tending to show that the sale was made upon inadequate consideration or was characterized by bad faith, the purchasing
corporation takes the property without liability for payment of the
vendor's unsecured debts. Nannegan v. Denver & S. F. 1. 7o., 16 L.
R. A. (N. S.) 874, 43 Colo. 122, 95 Pac. 343; L. & N. R. R. Go. v. Orr, 91
Ky. 109, 15 S. W. 8; L. & X. R. R. Co. v. Zachritz & Co., 18 Ky. 141.
C. P. R.

CIiN.mi

LAw-EVIDENCE HELD ISUFFICIENT IN

REGARD TO BLOOD.

HOUND USED IN TRAILING.The two appellants were jointly convicted
for burning a barn, with a felonious intent to collect the insurance.
It was the theory of the Commonwealth that the appellants, who owned
the barn, fired it and hurried away from the premises. Immediately
after the fire a deputy sheriff brought dogs which were reputed to be
bloodhounds and put them on the trail of the person seen leaving when
the fire broke out. It was objected for the defendants that evidence
as to the ability of the blood hound to follow a trail, was insufficient
to qualify bloodhounds whose trailing was offered in evidence. Held,
the evidence was insufficient to warrant the introduction of evidence
concerning the trailing by the hounds. Hays, et aL v. Commonwealtlh
211 Ky. 716, S. W. 1004.
The present case follows the general rule for qualifying a bloodhound, which is clearly presented in Pedigo v. Commonwealth, 103 Ky.
41, 44, S. W. 143, 42 L. R. A. 432, 82 Am. St. Rep. 566. It is there set
forth that testimony as to trailing an alleged criminal by a bloodhound may go to the jury as tending to connect him with the crime
only when there is reliable testimony "that the dog used has an acuteness of scent and power of discrimination which have been tested in
tracking human beings, and it is not sufficient to show that the dog is
of pure blood and of a stock characterized by those qualities." This
decision is supported by Blair v. Commonwealth, 171 Ky. 319, 188 S. W.
390, in which "admission of evidence of trailing of accused by bloodbounds was held error, where is was not shown that they were not
thoroughbred bloodhounds, or of such acuteness of scent as to be customarily trained for use and used in trailing persons"; and by State
v. Hall, 3 Ohio N. P. 125, which holds that "full opportunity should be
given to inquire into the breeding and testing of the dog," upon which
testimony will largely depend the weight to be given to the tracking
as evidence against the accused.
Though the cases on this subject are few, the rule is sufficiently
founded on reason and established in precedent to sustain the holding
of the present case. While fully established proof that such dogs can
and will follow a human trail unerringly might enable the capturing
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of many criminals, there is reason to insist upon certain conditions
and preliminary proofs which make the evidence of such trailing less
liable to work injustice than is the case if such eviddnce is admitted
without these precautions. In the present case the testimony was that
the bloodhound was high-bred and reliable. This testimony was held
not to come within the rule for qualifying a bloodhound whose trailIng is offered as evidence, and the evidence was excluded.
E. C. M.

EVIDENCE-LAYmAN

CANNOT DIAGNOSE DisEASEs,

on TESTIFY AS EX-

PERT IN REFERENCE THESETO.-In a suit upon a life insurance policy,
where the applicant had made representations, that he had never been
treated for certain diseases and had not been attended by a physician
during the five years previous to the date of the application, the company offered evidence of his family physician, who stated that applicant was under his care within less than five years before the date of
the application, and treated him for heart and stomach trouble.
The wife of the deceased testified that the stomach trouble lasted
only a week and that he had no palpitation of the heart, and manifested
no symptoms of either heart of stomach trouble until his last illness
began. Her testimony was corroborated by a number of laymen. Held,
this evidence was incompetent, and under facts of this case prejudicial.
The wife and the laymen being non-experts were not qualified to testify
that the applicant did not have heart or stomach trouble. Sovereign
Camp, W. 0. 'W. v. Morris, 212 Ky. 201, 278 S. W. 554.
That this testimony was incompetent has been decided by the
Kentucky court in Bardstown v. Yelson County, 121 Ky. 737, 90 S. W.
246; Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Go. v. Moss, 6 Ky. L. Rep. 49.
The principal reason for excluding the testimony of witnesses
laboring under disqualifications is that such testimony would, if presented to the jury be unsafe or tend to mislead rather than to accomplish the ends of justice. Elliott on Evidence, Vol. 2, Page 20, Sect. 713.
The decisions of the court of other states uniformly exclude the
evidence of non-experts as to diagnosis of disease. Ba~tinhore & L.
Turnpike Co. v. Cassel?, 66 Md. 419, 7 At. 805; Lombard & H. S. Pass.
By. Co. v. Christian, 124 Pa. St. 114; Monroeville v. "Weihl,130 Ohio Cir.
Ct. R. 689, 6 0. C. D. 188; Phieffer Stone Co. v. Shirley, 187 S. W. 930.
As to who can testify the court of Maryland says, it is true that
medical experts are the only witnesses competent to testify as to the
diagnosis of disease and in regard to its proper treatment secundum
artem, and to express an opinion a.3 to its probable duration, effects and
final termination. Baltimore & L. Turnpike Co. v. Cassell, 66 Md. 419,
7 Atl 805.
It is generally held that laymen are competent to testify as to the
apparent health of a person, such testimony being confined to matters
open to observation of the party testifying, such as eyesight, hearing,
nervousness and general health, Sovereign Camp, W. 0. W. v. Morris,
212 Ky. 201, 278 S. W. 554; Heddles v. Chicago By. Co., 77 Wis. 228,
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42 N. W. 237; Robinson v. Exempt Fire Co., 103 Cal. 1, 36 Pac. 955;
Atwood v. Atwood, 84 Conn. 169, 79 Atl. 59; Illinois Cent. Ry Co. v.
Rothschild, 134 Ill. 504; Berner v. Brotherhood of American Yoemen,
154 Ill. App. 27. Partello v. Missouri Pac. By. Co., 217 Mo. 645, 117
S. W. 1138.
The rule is modified by the court of South Carolina which holds
that where a witness is not a physician or an expert he is not ompetent to testify as to the physical condition of the plaintiff, Kirby v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 77 S. C. 404, 58 S. E. 10.
It seems that the rule in the principal case is both just and reasonable as well as in keeping with the general rule.
W. E. F.
EXECUTORS AND ADmIIISTRATORs-TETATORs DEBTs NOT PAID FROM
LEGACIES UNTm UNDEVISED RF4I, ESTATE HAS BEEN EXHAUSTED.-A testa-

tcr's will stated that after his just debts should be paid, he bequeathed
250 acres of land and all of his personal property to his wife. At his
death he owed $2,300.
He died leaving quite a lot of intestate property. This was sufficient to pay his debts. The question is: shall the debt and cost of
administration be paid out of the personal property, or shall the undevised real estate be chargeable with debts and costs of administration.
Held: The gift of personalty to the wife, was either a general or
specific legacy, and as such was not subject to the payment of debts
until after all undevised real estate has been exhausted. Strode v.
Strode, 280 S. W. 921, 213 Ky. 179.
It does not seem that the language of the will, "After the payment
of just debts and funeral expenses, I give," etc. sufficiently indicates a
fixed purpose on the part of the testator to charge the personalty with
the payment of his debts.
The general rule is that in the absence of specific legacy or any
provisions to the contrary the debts of the testator are to be paid out
of the personal property. In Re Wvoodworth, 31 Cal. 596; Jackson v.
Bevins, 74 Conn. 96, 49 Atl. 899. Enders v. Enders, 49 Mich. 182, 13 N.
W. 507; Riegelman's Estate, 174 Pa. 476, 34 Atl. 120; Toner v. Collins,
67 Iowa 369, 25 N. W. 287; Elliott v. Carter, 9 Gratt, 541.
This fund is the primary and only fund unless the intent of the
testator as shown in the will is to charge thd real estate. Zreek v.
Park, 100 Ky. 37, 37 S. W. 271; M. Campbell v. M. Campbell, 5 Litt. 92,
15 Am. Dec. 48; MeVean v. Wagoner, 58 S. W. 594, 22 K. L. R. 634;
Porter v. Ford, 7 S. W. 28, 91 K. L. R. 703. Only the express or implied intent of the testator is sufficient to defeat this rule. In Re Woodworth's Estate, 31 Cal. 595; Riegelman's Estate Richardson v. Hall, 124
Mass. 228. This right of the testator to exonerate a part of his property
and cause the rest to bear the burden of his debts, of course rests upon
the intent of the testator as evidenced by the will. Vradenburg v.
French, 105 Va. 16, 52 S. E. 695, 115 A. S. R. 838. The undevised real
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property must be subject to the debt where the will specifically devises
the other real and all the personal property. Trumbo v. Borrenmy,
3 T. B. Monroe 284; In re Bragg, 166 Cal. 103, 134 Pac. 1140; Davis v.
Alin's Executor, 198 Ky. 669, 249 S. W. 1013; Alexander v. Wailer,
6 Bush 341.
The rule as laid down in this case seems to be the general rule
founded upon the cardinal rule of the courts in the interpretation of
wills, to carry out the intent of the testator. French v. Vradenburg,
105 Va. 16, 52 S. E. 695. The case closely follows the rules laid down
in Elliott v. Carter, 9 Gratt, 541, where it was held that the following
rule determining the order in which- the different funds or subjects of
property constituting the estate of the deceased testator shall be applied to the payment of debts. 1. The personal estate at large, not
exempted by the terms of the will or necessary implication; 2. Real
estate, or an interest therein, expressly set apart by the will for the
payment of debts; 3. Real estate descended to the heir; 4. Real of
personal property expressly charged with payment of debts, and subject to such charge, specifically bequeathed; 5. General pecuniary
legacies; 6. Specific legacies; and 7. Real estate devised by the
will. Crouch v. Davis' Executor, 23 Grass. 62; Cockerville v. Dale, 33
Gratt. 45; Edmun's Administrator v. Scott, 78 Va. 72; Allan, v. Patton,
83 Va. 255, 2 S. E. 143; Fraser v. Littleton's Estate, 100 Va. 9, 40 S. E.
180; Davie v. Allen's Executor, 108 Ky. 669, 249 S. W. 1013.
Last in order of liability of property actually owned by the decedent are chattels specificially bequeathed and real estate specifically
devised without being subject to a testamentary charge of debts. Garton v. Hancock, 2 Atk. 434; Livingstone v. Newkirk, 3 John's Ch. (N.
Y.) 312; Hoover v. Hoover, 5 Pa. St. 351; Pyotl's Estate, 160 Pa. 441.
W. E. F.
INSUMANCE-DELIVERY OF POLICY BY COIPANY To AGENT HELD TO
HAVE CONSTITUTED UNCONDITIONAL DELIVERY TO INsURED.-A fireman
applied to defendant's local agent for an accident policy. His written
application, together with policy fee and four weekly premiums in advance was accepted by the company and the policy issued and mailed
to the ageht for delivery to insured on the 12th of January. It was
received by the agent on the 13th. On each of these days the insured
was alive and in good health. On the 14th he was killed in an accident. In an action by the beneficiary to recover on the policy it was
held, that delivery to the agent constituted an unconditional delivery
to insured, though the agent wds required to make certain memoranda
from the policy. Ife-tucky Central Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Pemberton, 212 Ky. 510, 279 S. W. 968.
The courts are uniform on the rule that actual delivery of an insurance policy is ndt essential unless expressly made so by the terms
of the agreement. Van Arsdale-Osborne Brokerage Co. v. Cooper, 23
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Okl. 598, 115 Pac. 779; Edwards v. Business Men's Ace. Assoc., 205
Mo. A. 102, 221 S. W. 422.
The receipt by an agent of the company of the policy for unconditional delivery to insured, nothing further remaining to be done by
the insured except the formal act of receiving the policy is equivalent
in law to a delivery to the insured. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Smith,
129 Miss, 544, 91 Sou. 456. The court in commenting said, "It is the
intention of the parties that governs and not the manual possession
of the policy. Where there is an intention on the part of the insurer
to part with the control of the policy and to place it in the control of
the insured or some person acting for him, that is sufficient to constitute delivery."
The Georgia court stated the rule a little strongly in New York
Life Ins. Co. v. Babcock, 104 Ga. 67, 30 S. E. 273, 69 Am. S. R. 134, 42
L. R. A. 88, where it was held that the receipt by an agent from his
insurance company of a policy to be unconditionally delivered by him
to the, applicant is in law tantamount to a delivery to the insured,
although the agent never parts with the possession of the policy and
although its delivery to the applicant is by contract made essential to
its validity. The general rule which was well stated by the Alabama
court is that delivery to the agent is delivery to the insured and is
sufficient to put the insurance into effect, though the agent retains the
policy in his own keeping. Stephenson v. Allison, 165 Ala. 238, 51 Sou.
622, 138 Am. S. R. 26. The general rule is adherred to by a large
majority of the state courts. It was closely followed in Porter v.
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 70 Vt. 504, 41 Atl. 970, and in Wenz v. Business
Men's Ass'n of America, 212 Ill. App. 581. The insurer was held liable
on a policy never actually received but where the premium had been
paid, the application accepted and the policy mailed to the agent for
delivery prior to the date of sickness from which the insured died.
Unterhardscheidt v. Mo. State Life Ins. Co., 160 Ia. 234, 138 N. W. 459,
45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 743. The same view was substantially taken in
Francis v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 65 Or. 280, 106 Pac. 323.
There are two lines of cases in this state dealing with this question.
One holds that where a policy or application provides the insurance
shlal not be effective until delivered to the insured, while he is living
and in good health, if at the time of the delivery to the agent the insured is not living or in good health the delivery to the agent is not
a delivery to the insured. Snedaker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 160
Ky. 119, 169 S. W. 570; Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 136 Ky.
339, 124 S. W. 345. The other line holds that if at the time of such
delivery to the agent the insured is living and in good health; and
there remains nothing for him to do to make the policy effective, then
the delivery by the company to its agent for delivery to the insured will
be deemed unconditional delivery for that purpose. Mutual Life Ins.
Co. v. Thomson, 94 Ky. '253, 22 S. W. 87; Commonwealth Life Ins. Co.
v. McGuire, 190 Ky. 134, 226 S. W. 402. The principal case falls dl
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rectly in line with the latter line of cases and seems to be right both
on principle and authority. It is consistent with the great weight of
authority and shows that the Kenucky court has followed the genera]
rule.
R. R. R.
LICENSES-LIcENSE

TAx ORDINANCE

CLASSIFYING GROCERY

STORES

A1D IMMosING DIFmnNT TAx oN EACn CL&SS, nEmD DIScRImINATORY.The City of X has enacted a license and occupational tax ordinance
in which among other things it has imposed a license tax on the business of retailing groceries, meats, and oysters. The ordinance classified the business upon the following basis: regular service grocery
stores not employing more than two employees, upon which a license
of $12 per year and $5 for each additional employee; cash and carry
grocery stores not self-service and not employing more than two persons upon which a license of $50.00 and $15.00 for each additional
'employee was imposed; and self-service, cash and carry, grocery stores
not employing more than two persons, upon which a license of $40.00
and $30.00 for each additional employee was imposed. The appellee
comes within the second class mentioned above. Alleging that the city
of X was threatening to collect by coercive measures the $50.00 license
fee imposed by this ordinance and that the same was unjust and discriminatory, the appellee brought suit to enjoin the enforcement of the
ordinance. Held, that the classification was unreasonable and discriminatory. City of Danville et al. v. The Quaker Maid Inc., 211 Ky. 677,
278 S. W. 98.
The court declared that it was agreed that where there was a
license tax imposed upon a class of persons engaged in a particular
business, trade, or occupation, then all persons engaged in such business, trade, or occupation are subject to the tax and it must be uniform upon the class singled out for taxation. It was also agreed that
persons engaged in the same trade, business, or occupation may be
classified and a different license tax imposed upon each class provided
that the classification is made upon a reasonable basis. Commonwealth
v. Payne Medicine Co., 138 Ky. 164, 127 Ky. 760; City of Louisville
v. Bagolowski d Son, 136 Ky. 324, 124 S. W. 339; Hager v. Walker, 128,
Ky. 1, 107 S. W. 254, 32 Ky. Law Rep. 748, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 195, 129
Ant. St. Rep. 428; Brown-Foreman Co. v. Commonwealth, 125 Ky. 402,
101 S. W. 321.
The business of the appellee is to sell groceries of the same kind,
character, quality, and for practically the same price as the ordinary
grocery store. The only difference in the appellee and the ordinary
business is that the appellee extends credit to no one and makes no
deliveries. This difference in this detail of conducting the business
affords no reasonable grounds for classifying appellee upon a basis
for taxation purposes different from the ofdinary grocery store. The
detail of delivery and credit are alone not enough to afford a reasonable basis for the classification attempted in this case.
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In considering the reasonableness of the distinction between merchants and sample merchants and testing the validity of a statute
making such a classification the court stated that a legislature has a
right to discriminate between a merchant and a sample merchant by
taxing the business of the one heavily while taxing that the other
lightly; or taxing the one heavily and that of the other not at all. The
State is sovereign mistress of her own policy in determining what
classes she shall lay a license' tax upon and what classes she shall
exempt from taxation; and deciding how lightly or heavily she shall
make this sort of taxes. She cannot, it is true, in exercising the sovereign function discriminate expressly or practically against non-residents in favor of residents, or against property sold here in favor of
property held in this state for sale. Merchants of other states may
establish branch houses here without becoming residents; and also residents of the state may from stocks of goods in warehouses, sell by sample
agents without engaging in the ordinary way of merchants. It seems
that the assumption that a merchant is necessarily a resident and a
sample merchant is necessarily a non-resident is an arbitrary one not
sustained by proof, and one which a court has no right by mere inference to accept as true. Ex parte Thornton, 12 Fed. 538.
It is a basic rule of law relating to licenses that a state Or a municipality should not arbitrarily discriminate against persons or classes
of persons. Georgia Packing Go. v. Macon, 60 Fed. 774, 22 L. R. A. 775;
Commonwealth v. Hanna, 195 Mass. 262, 81 N. E. 149, 11 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 799. A Statute or an ordinance, which in imposing a license tax,
discriminates in favor of residents of the city or state as against nonresidents in the same class is unconstitutional. Such classifications
are unreasonable, tend to restrain trade, and to create monopoly; and
insofar as they apply to residents ef other states, deny the equal protection of the laws and violate the rule that the citizens of each state
are entitled to all the immunities of the citizens of the several states.
Simrall v. Covington, 90 Ky. 444, 14 S. W. 369, 29 A. S. R. 398, 9 L. R. A.
556; State v. Wiggins, 64 N. H. 508, 15 Atl. 128, 1 L. R. A. 56. C. P. R.
MuNicniAL COBPORATIONS-TRAVELER INJURED BV SERVITUDE PUT ON
HIGHWAY By ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNER MAY SUE HI onORCITY o BOTH
FOR DAMAGES.-INDEMNITY-CITY

MAY RECOVER FROm ABUTTING PROPERTY
INJURIES DUE TO SERVITUDE

OwNER AiMOUNT PAID As DAMAGES FOR

PLACED ON PUBLIC HIGHWAY BY SUCH: OWNE.-In the present action the
City of Ashland is suing one of its property owners to recover from
him damages assessed against the city in favor of a woman who was
injured due to a defective sidewalk while walking upon it in front
of the property owner's premises. A city ordinance required all property owners to build and keep in good repair sidewalks in front of
their premises, with a penalty for failure of compliance. Recovery was
denied. City of Ashland v. Vansant-Kitchen Lumber Co., 213 Ky. 518.
The court erred in denying a recovery distinguished this case from
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one in which the traveler is injured be some servitude or burden put
In or on the highway by an abutting property owner for his own benefit; in such a case, if the traveler recovers from the city, as he may,
the city may recover from the abutting property owner. City of Louisville v. Metropolitan Realty Co., 168 Ky. 204, 182 S. W. 172. But in
this case there was no servitude for the benefit of the abutting property
owner. In quoting from a similar case (Webster v. C. & 0., 105 S. W.
945) the court said, "The obligation of the municipality to keep its
streets in a reasonably safe condition for public travel is unconditional,
and this duty it can not relieve itself by attempting to shift the responsibility to an abutting owner. .......
If under an ordinance
authorized by the charter the city may require the property owner to
keep in repair the sidewalks in front of his premises the obligation is
one which he owes to the city, not to the Individual. It does not impose
any duty the breach of which would make him liable to the traveler."
Thus it follows that the duty to keep the sidewalks in repair is
primary with the city, and only secondary with the abutting property
owner; and if the city has to pay damages for the breach of this duty,
there need be no contribution by the property owner. The penalty
under the statute may be imposed, however. But if the city charter
stipulates for abutting property owners to keep the streets in good
repair, then the property owner becomes primarily liable for injuries
due to a breach of that duty. City of Rochester v. Campbell, 20 Am.
St. Rep. 760; Gottlieb v. City of 2ew York, et al., 149 N. Y. Supp. 589.
R. R. C.

NGLIGoNIC--'IVrTEE"

AND

"LicEuNsE'

o

DiSTINGUISHED--ORDINARY

CARl REQUnED AS TO AN "INvITEE."-The defendant company erected
and maintained narrow gauge railroad tracks, used exclusively for the
erection of the Dix river dam. Plaintiff and his infant son of sixteen
years were employees. The son notified the foreman he was quitting
work on a certain day. His card was signed and he was told he must
return to get his pay. He came back on the following day and presented his card to the cashier, who refused to pay him until he got another card signed covering the second half of the month. While going
to get the foreman's signature, the father and son walked together
on the narrow gauge track. While the attention of the son was drawn
by a train approaching on another track, and a train coming up behind hit and killed him. Held, that decedent was an invitee and defendant was required to exercise ordinary care for decedent's safety.
Defendant owed him a lookout duty. Myers Co. v. Logue's Adm'r., 212
Ky. 802, 280 S. W. 107.
The court distinguished between an invitee and a licensee, saying
that an invitee to a place of business is one that goes there by express
or implied invitation of the owner or occupant on the mutual interest
of both, or in connection with the business of the owner or occupant
which Is there being carried on; while a licensee goes on the premises

KENTUcKY LAW JOuRNAL
by expressed invitation of owner or occupant or with his acquiescence
for the licensee's own business, pleasure, or convenience. Leonard v.
Enterprise Realty, 187 Ky. 578, 219 S. W. 1066; Southern R. Co. v.
Goddard, 121 Ky. 567, 89 S. W. 675. The reason for the decision in the
present case was that deceased had an Implied invitation to come back
and get the fruits of his labor.
An insurance agent with permission to solicit for insurance has
been held to be a licensee, the court said that the owner or occupant
owes him the duty not to wilfully or wantonly injure him. Indian
Refining Co. v. Mobley, 134 Ky. 822, 121 S. W. 657; Sterger v. Sicklen,
132 N. Y. 499, 28 Am. St. Rep. 594; Pooling v. Ohio R. Co., 38 W. Va.
645. We find the Court of Appeals of Kentucky holding a person to
be a licensee where he went to a sawmill to purchase wood and
injured while loading at a place not intended for loading. Furgeson &
Palmer Co. v. Furgeson's Adm'r., 114 S. W. 297. In another case, deceased was sent for to do some work on a ship, and another had been
engaged before he got there; deceased was drunk and while he was
attempting to go from one part of the boat to another, was drowned.
He was held to a licensee. Cunningham v. Ayer & Lord Tie Co.,
133 Ky. 642, 118 S. W. 948.
The rule is well settled that the owner of premises owes to the
licensee no duty as to the condition of such premises, save that he
should not let him run upon a hidden peril or wantonly or wilfully
cause him harm. Tully v. PhiladelphiaR. Co., 50 At. 95; Blackstone
v. Chelmsford Foundry Co., 170 Mass. 321, 49 N. E. 635; Schriner v.
Great Northern R. Co., 86 Minn. 245, 90 N. W. 400.
In Kentucky there seem to be no cases where the owner or occupant is required to notify a licensee of hidden perils, but the latter
must take the premises as he finds them. This is true where there has
been no allurement, enticement, or inducement held out to him by the
occupant, and he enters the premises by permission only; he enjoys
the license subject to Its concomitant perils. Johnson v. Paducah
Laundry Co., 122 Ky. 369, 92 S. W. 330; Sween/y v. Ol Colony R. Co.,
87 Am. Dec. 644; Severy v. Nickerson, 120 Mass. 306, 21 Am. Rep. 514.
In the following cases, the parties have been held to be licensees:
one who enters the premises as a visitor. Shea v. Gurney, 163 Mass.
184, 39 N. E. 996; Woo7wine v. Chesapeake R. Co., 36 W. Va. 329, 15
S. E. 81; to view machinery, Benson v. Baltimore Traction Co., 77 Md.
535, 26 Ati. 973; or to seek employment, Larmore v. Crown Point Iron
Co., 101 N. Y. 391, 4 N. E. 752. One who took refuge in a hotel to escape
a thunderstorm was also held to be a licensee, 30 Hun. (N. Y.) 596.
The owner or occupant of premises who induces others to come
upon it by invitation expressed or implied owes to them the duty of
using reasonable ordinary care to keep the premises in a safe or suitable condition. Anderson & Nelson Distilling Co. v. Hair, 44 S. W. 658,
19 K. L. R. 1822, 103 Ky. 196; Tucker v. Draper,62 Neb. 66, 86 N. W.
917; Bennett v. L,. & N. R. Co., 102 U. S. 577. This last case originated
in Kentucky and was carried up to the United States Supreme Court
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which court went even so far as to say in addition to the rule mentioned
above that where one is invited on the premises expressly or impliedly,
the owner or occupant must give warning of latent or concealed defects
if known by the owner or occupant, and unknown to the invitee.
W. C. R.
PATNERsHI--"PAnTNEssIP" IS RESULT OF INTENTION ON THE PART
OF PARTIES-CONDUcT

MAY CREATE ESTOPPEL TO DENY PARTNERSHap RE-

LATioN.-Action was instituted against appellee to recover judgment
for something more than $2,000.00 on the theory that he was a partner
with a highway contractor to whom appellants had sold supplies and
from whom they had been unable to collect owing to insolvency.
Appellants sought to establish the existence of the partnership by a
written contract between appellee and the highway contractor by which
the contractor agreed to give appellee a certain part of the net profits
of a named road project for the loan and use of $15,000.00 with which
to carry on the work. Held, agreement to furnish money for contractor for part of profits, without suffering any loss, Is not a partnership. Roy C. Wayne Supply Co. v. McGowan, 213 Ky. 102, - S. W. -.
The fundamental rule in determining the existence of a partnership is the intention of the parties as appears from their agreement
and all the facts in the case. Meehan v. Valentine, 145 U. S. 611; Richardson v. Hughitt, 74 N. Y. 55; Thiflman v. Benton, 82 Md. 64, 33 Atl.
485; Stone v. Turfman's Supply Co., 103 Ky. 318, 45 S. W. 78; Roberts
v. Adams & Sons Co., 33 Ky. L. Rep. 207, 110 S. W. 314.
As stated in Stewart v. Stovall, 191 Ky. 508, 230 S. W. 929, "By
intention is meant the legal intention deducible from the language of
the contract and the acts of the parties; and, if they intend to do
things which in law constitute a partnership, they are partners, whether
their purpose was to create or avoid the relation."
Sharing in profits does not in itself constitute partnership. Fuqua
and Smith v. Massie and Sons, 95 Ky. 387, 25 S. W. 875; Stone v. Turf.
man's Supply Co., Supra; Studebaker v. Dobbs & Runge, 161 Ky. 542,
171 S. W. 167. It is, however, an important fact tending to prove part
nership. Boreing v. Wilson, 128 Ky. 570, 108 S. W. 914.
Where a partnership does not actually exist, but one holds himself
out to be the partner of another, and a third person is led to believe
he is a partner and advances credit on that belief, the one who holds
himself out is estopped to deny the partnership relation. In re FooZd,
Fed. Cas. No. 5, 604 (2 Hask. 34); Markham's Ex'r. v. Jones, 46 Ky. (7
B. Mon.) 456; Wabath v. Viley, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 478.
Where, however, as in this case, there is no intention to form a
parntnership, and one does not hold himself out as a partner, the
principle of estoppel cannot be applied, and the sharing of net profits
in lieu of interest on money loaned, in the absence of other requisites
to constitute partnership, shows merely a debtor-creditor relationship
between the parties, and not a partnership.
W. H. H.
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PLEDGES-PLEDGE NEED NOT BE IN WRITING---PLEDGE MUST 3E ACCOMPANIED BY DELIvEny OF PROPERTY PLEnoDE.-Appellee brought this
action to enforce the payment of an unsatisfied judgment amounting
to $518.10. Appellee obtained an attachment against the judgment
debtor and his property. The appellant became a party to the suit by
an intervening petition which attacked the appellee's attachment on
the ground that the property before the creation of the debt in favor
of the appellee, had been pledged to the appellant to secure a debt
it held against him.
The judgment debtor had borrowed $4,500.00 from the appellant and
had secured the note by a deed of trust which conveyed certain real
estate and other property. Later, the debtor with the consent of the
appellant traded the property previously mortgaged by the deed of
trust for 200 shares of stock in the J. Drilling Company. These 200
share. of stock were delivered to and accepted by the appellant as
collateral security in place of the deed of trust. Still later the debtor
traded this stock for 83 shares of stock in the N. Drilling -Company of
West Virginia.
It was these 83 shares of stock which the appellee attached. While
the debtor had agreed to deliver and the appellant to accept the 83
shares in exchange for the 200 shares of the J. Drilling Company stock
which it had held as collateral security on the note, the debtor did not
actually deliver the 83 shares of stock to the appellant until some two
months after the attachment had been made by appellee; nor, was the
agreement between the debtor and the appellant in written form.
The court held "that a contract of pledge need not be in writing,
but to be good in law, especially as to third parties, it must be accompanied with the pledger's delivery to the pledgee of the thing or property pledged. The pledging of property cannot be effected by promise
or intention." Inasmuch as the appellant did not acquire possession
of the 83 shares before the attachment, it had, the court held, no lien
on the same superior to that created by the appellee's attachment.
People's Bank of Harrisville v. Continental Supply Company, 213 Ky.
44, 280 S. W. 458.
The same question had been presented to this court a year before
this case was decided and it was held that a pledge was good although
not in writing if it was accompanied with the delivery to the pledgee
of the thing pledged. Masson & Moondy v. Scruggs, 207 Ky. 66, 628 S.
W. 833. Indeed this has been the uniform holding of the Kentucky
court for more than a century at the least. Hamilton v. Wagner, 9 Ky.
331; Sanders v. Davis, 52 Ky. 431; Little v. Berry, 113 S. W. (Ky.) 902.
The last cited case is precisely in accord with the case we have
at hand. In that case the court said: "A mere promise of the debtor
that he will hold certain property exclusively liable to a particular
debt, without delivery of it of any kind, cannot, upon most obvious
principles of public policy, be deemed a pledge of such property."
That such a rule has its roots in public policy is borne out by the
following cases: Casey v. Cavaroc, 96 U. S. 467; Fourt. Nat. Bank
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V. Milbourne Mill8 Co., 172 Fed. 177; Wilson v. Little, 2 N. Y. 443;
Buffalo German Ins. Co. v. Buffalo Third National Ban7, 162 N. Y. 163.
In the first named case, Mr. Justice Bradley says: "The requirement of possession is an inexorable rule of law, adopted to prevent
fraud and deception, for, if the debtor remains in possession, the law
presumes that those who deal with him do so on the faith of his being
th unqualified owner of the goods."
Overlooking minor differences, as for example the sufficiency of
constructive possession in this regard, the United States Supreme
Court and the various state courts of appeal are practically unanimous
in holding, as the Kentucky court does that the pledge need not be in
writing but, if not in writing, must be accompanied with the delivery
to the pledgee of the thing or property pledged. Yeatman, Assignee, v.
i. 0. S. Inst., 95 U. S. 764.
G. R.

SUBSCRrPTION-W

TR!EN INSTRU31ENT FILE

AS ExHmIrr WAS NOT A

SUnscRn ro--OitAL SUBscrmrIoN-D instituted an action against L
to recover $500.00 alleged to have been orally subscribed by L to a school
district for the purpose of purchasing land on which to erect a school
building. D filed with his petition a written instrument signed by another party for L as an exhibit and evidence of the subscription. L.
by demurrer, claimed the instrument could not be construed as a subscription. Judgment for D. Lewis v. Durham, 205 Ky. 403, 265 S. -W.
934.
The question as to whether an oral promise evidenced by a written
instrument signed by another party for the one to be charged is a
subscription, is a new one in Kentucky. In Pomeroy v. Fullerton, 113
Mo. 440, 21 S. W. 19, the court said, "It has been held that exhibits
filed with a petition form no part thereof and cannot be considered in
determining its sufficiency on demurrer." In this case this point is
not the one upon which the decision is based; therefore we may dismiss
it by saying, "If the exhibit is not the foundation for the cause of action
or of the defense, it will not be considered." Barnes v. Moury, 129 Ind.
568, 28 N. E. 535.
Oral subscriptions have been sustained as a general rule. Ruten.
beck v. Hohn, 143 Ia. 13, 121 N. W. 698, 136 A. S. R. 731, and note.
However, there is authority the other way. Fanning v. Hibernia Insurance Co., 37 Ohio St. 339, 41 Am. Rep. 577.
This case can be placed in the same class with those which have
decided that oral promises to contribute specified sums for the erection
of a pub]ic building are binding. George v. Harris, 4 N. H. 533, 17
Am. Dec. 446. Therefore, the rule will apply that it is not necessary
for the contract to be in writing unless required by the charter or
by statute. Walter v. Mercee Academy Association, 59 Pac. 136, 126
Cal. 582.
A strict definition of the word subscription involves the idea of a
written signature, yet by common usage it is often employed to include
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an agreement written or oral, to give or pay some amount to a designated purpose, more usually perhaps, to some purpose for the promotion of which numerous persons are uniting their means and their
efforts. Fulton v. Clayton, 54 Ia. 425, 6 N. W. 685, 37 Am. Rep. 43.
The Kentucky Court by their decision in this case seem to think
an oral subscription binding, and therefore have decided with the
weight of authority.
R. C. S.

